**Party survival in parliament - Online appendix**

**Part 1: Established and New Democracies; Similarities and Differences**

This part of the appendix discusses similarities and differences between established and new democracies with respect to the two questions discussed in the main text. This discussion is motivated both by the theory presented in the text, but also by the shape of the data. That is, in new democracies the maximum number of elections a party can survive is 9, where most countries had only 6 or 7 democratic elections since the breakdown of the Soviet Union. In other countries, those that are labeled "Established democracies", the number of election varies between 13 and 24. Here again, one can divide established democracies to those who democratized in the third wave of democracy and those who were democracies before or shortly after WWII. To summarize what follows, the differences between new and established democracies regarding party survival seem to be an outcome of the reality of late democratization, not substantive differences that mediate the results shown in the main text.

Figure A1 shows a comparison between the Kaplan-Meier survival estimation of parties in new democracies (defined as countries who held first democratic elections after 1988) and established democracies (all other countries). Both visually and based on the Log-rank test, one can see that the distribution of party duration in these two groups of countries is different. Figure A1 shows that in new democracies parties' survival rate is lower throughout the x axis. Although higher proportion of parties fails in new democracies, it does not mean that the shape of the hazard is different. Figure A2 differentiates between the hazard function in new and established democracies. Both panels of Figure A2 imply that the hazard of failure increases and then decreases. As expected from the theory in the main text and from Figure A1, the hazard of failure is higher in new democracies. It increases (more rapidly in establishes democracies) in the first three elections, but then declines as time progresses (less rapidly in new democracies). From the data presented in Figure A1 and A2, one cannot conclude that there are substantive differences between party survival in East-European and other countries. Such a conclusion can be made only by future research, preferably only after enough time will pass to washout the differences between the number of elections in new and established democracies.

Regarding the second question (which parties survive longer?), there are two notable differences between new and established democracies. Figure A3 shows the model specification of party survival that is discussed in the text. Note that as explained below in this appendix, this model fits the data better than any model specification tested. In Figure A3 three models are shown, all are specified the same, but with a different set of countries. Model 1 is the pooled set of all 37 countries in the dataset (shown in Figure 4 in the main text). Model 2 (shown in Figure 6 in the main text) excludes 11 Post-Communist countries leaving in the analysis the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Model 3 examines the remaining 11 Post-Communist countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

Before discussing the differences between the three models, note that all three are very similar. The results from all three models support the same substantive conclusions that were presented

in the main text. The two differences between new and established democracies are that; (1) being a junior coalition partner is not associated with longer survival in new democracies. In established democracies the coefficient on this variable is much larger (37% increase relative to 11% increase in new democracies), and statistically significant ($p$=0.00), while insignificant in new democracies. The second point of difference between established and new democracies is that in the Post-Communist countries ideological space does not imply longer duration of survival. Here again the coefficient is statistically insignificant. While the results in new democracies are weaker in statistical sense, they do not mediate the conclusions presented in the main text. Like in the case of the first question, the differences between new and established democracies can be attributed to the lesser data, and should be revisited in the future.

Figure A1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimation of Parties in New and Established Democracies




Note: Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions: $X^2(1)=23.38$, Pr=0.00

Figure A2: Hazard Function of Party Survival in New and Established Democracies




Note: This figure includes all parties from 26 established democracies.




Note: This figure includes all parties from 11 Post-Communist democracies.

Figure A3: Party Survival in New and Established Democracies




Note: Nodes represent coefficients of log-normal duration models where positive coefficients imply longer survival time. Bars show 95% confidence intervals. Country fixed-effects are not shown. Model 1: N=3,631; AIC=1,771.9; Log Pseudolikelihood=-841.9. Model 2: N=3,052; AIC=1,217.6; Log Pseudolikelihood=-597.6. Model 3: N=579; AIC=460.1; Log Pseudolikelihood=-211.1.

**Part 2: Additional Robustness Checks and Models Fit**

The purpose of this part of the appendix is to test the robustness of the results shown in the main text. This appendix includes three robustness checks. Both Table A1 and Table A2 support the argument that among a variety of estimation strategies, the log-normal regression maximizes goodness-of-fit for the data used in this paper. In Table A3 seven different model specifications are shown, all of them use the log-normal regression. Table A3 shows that the results are consistent for a variety of model specifications, and that the model presented in the text fits the data best. Table A4 shows the same model specification using the Cox proportional hazard model. The Cox model supports the same substantive conclusions presented in the text, despite estimating the hazard of failure and not Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) as log-normal regressions do.

To assess the fit of the model to the data, three criteria can be compared – the Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), or the log-likelihood of the model (LL). If the hazard is log-normal in shape, the values of all three criteria should be the lowest for the log-normal regression, assuming the same set of covariates used. Table 1 shows the model presented in the text, but estimated using six different parametric models and the Cox proportional hazard model. As one can note from Table A1, the log-likelihood (LL), the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), are all minimized when a log-normal model is estimated. These results indicate that the log-normal model fits the

data better than any other estimation strategy. The three indicators for goodness-of-fit for other model specifications are shown in Table A2. They all point towards the same conclusion – that the log-normal regression best fits the data. The substantive implication of this statistical result is that the hazard of failure increases before it begins to decline.

In addition to the goodness-of-fit, Table A1 adds another robustness check. It shows that the results presented in the text are consistent with other modelling strategies. Across the variety of both parametric models the conclusions discussed in the paper hold. In all models space, government participation and the size of the party are associated with longer duration (log-normal, log-logistic, exponential, and Weibull models) or lower hazard (Gompertz and Cox).

Table A1: Robustness Checks – Parametric Duration Models and Cox Proportional Hazard Model

| | Log-Normal | Log-Logistic | Exponential | Weibull | Gompertz | Cox PH | Gamma |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moderate | **1.05** | 1.04 | 1.09* | 1.07* | .92* | .93* | |
| | **(.03)** | (.03) | (.04) | (.04) | (.03) | (.03) | |
| Space | **1.17*** | 1.15* | 1.28* | 1.20* | .78* | .79* | |
| | **(.05)** | (.05) | (.07) | (.06) | (.04) | (.04) | |
| Prime-Minister | **1.62*** | 1.57* | 2.51* | 1.76* | .39* | .39* | |
| | **(.23)** | (.24) | (.63) | (.34) | (.09) | (.10) | |
| Junior Coalition Partner | **1.23*** | 1.26* | 1.27 | 1.22* | .78* | .80* | |
| | **(.10)** | (.09) | (.14) | (.11) | (.09) | (.09) | |
| Electoral Reform | **.89** | .92 | .86 | .86* | 1.15 | 1.13 | The Gamma regression estimation is not concave |
| | **(.06)** | (.06) | (.08) | (.06) | (.11) | (.11) | |
| Electoral Permissiveness | **1.10** | 1.07 | 1.19 | 1.16 | .84 | .89 | |
| | **(.10)** | (.09) | (.15) | (.10) | (.11) | (.11) | |
| Lagged Seat Share | **1.06*** | 1.06* | 1.06* | 1.07* | .94* | .95* | |
| | **(.01)** | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | |
| SE Cluster / Shared Frailty | **Party** | Party | Party | Party | Party | Party | |
| Country Fixed-Effects | **Yes** | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| N (Time at Risk) | **3,631** | 3,631 | 3,631 | 3,631 | 3,631 | 3,631 | |
| Scale Parameter | **.82** | .46 | | 1.34 | -.02 | | |
| Log-Likelihood | **-841** | -843 | -953 | -901 | -934 | -3,107 | |
| AIC | **1,772** | 1,774 | 1,957 | 1,890 | 1,957 | 6,298 | |
| BIC | **2,044** | 2,047 | 2,223 | 2,163 | 2,230 | 6,559 | |

Table A2: AIC and Log-Likelihoods for Party Survival

| | Full Model | | | Basic Model (No Controls) | | | Covariates Free Model | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | LL | AIC | BIC | LL | AIC | BIC | LL | AIC | BIC |
| **Log-Normal** | **-841.8** | **1,771.5** | **2,044.5** | **-853.6** | **1,793.3** | **2,060.1** | **-1,080.7** | **2,237.4** | **2,474.3** |
| Log-Logistic | -842.9 | 1,773.8 | 2,046.4 | -854.2 | 1,794.4 | 2,061.3 | -1,091.5 | 2,259.1 | 2,496.1 |
| Exponential | -935.2 | 1,956.5 | 2,223.0 | -950.5 | 1,985.0 | 2,245.7 | -1,155.6 | 2,384.3 | 2,616.0 |
| Weibull | -901.0 | 1,890.0 | 2,162.7 | -916.2 | 1,918.3 | 2,185.2 | -1,155.3 | 2,386.5 | 2,623.5 |
| Gompertz | -934.5 | 1,957.1 | 2,229.7 | -949.7 | 1,985.4 | 2,252.2 | -1,117.9 | 2,311.8 | 2,548.8 |
| Cox PH | -3,018.3 | 6,120.6 | 6,380.9 | -3077.9 | 6,237.8 | 6,492.3 | -3,437.0 | 6,946.0 | 7,170.5 |

Table A3 demonstrates that the results presented in the text are not an outcome of model specification. Throughout the seven log-normal model specifications presented in Table A3, the results are consistent with two small exceptions when the model controls for the party size using the lagged seat share of the party. First, when party size is controlled for, the size of the coefficients on both being the party of the Prime-Minister and a junior coalition member decreases. The lower coefficients on government participation are expected because the prime ministerial party is usually the largest party in parliament. A second difference is that both the size of the coefficient and the statistical significance of moderate Left-Right position decreases. This is also an expected result as parties that take extreme positions are (on average) smaller.

The models presented in Table A3 are the following. Model I estimates the effect of four covariates: moderate Left-Right positions, ideological space (distance from other parties), being the Prime-Minister's party, and being a junior coalition party. The standard errors for this model are clustered around the party. Model II estimates the same set of covariates and standard errors, but adds country-fixed effects. Model III adds a control for electoral reform, and Model IV adds a measure for the electoral permissiveness to the covariates estimated in Model III. All the coefficients and their statistical significance are stable in the first four models. Models V, VI, and VII add a control for party size (lagged seat share). The difference between these models is that Model V estimates standard errors clustered at the party level, while models VI and VII estimate shared frailty at the country and country-election levels respectively. Here again models V, VI, VII are consistent and support the arguments made in the main text; parties are better off taking a distinctive position than a moderate one, and that government participation is associated with longer survival duration.

Table A3: Robustness Checks – Log-Normal estimation

| | I | II | III | IV | **V** | VI | VII |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moderate | 1.08* | 1.14* | 1.11* | 1.12* | **1.05** | 1.05 | 1.05 |
| | (.04) | (.04) | (.04) | (.04) | **(.03)** | (.03) | (.03) |
| Space | 1.28* | 1.33* | 1.33* | 1.33* | **1.17*** | 1.17* | 1.16* |
| | (.07) | (.07) | (.07) | (.07) | **(.05)** | (.04) | (.04) |
| Prime-Minister | 3.49* | 3.89* | 3.88* | 3.98* | **1.62*** | 1.62* | 1.61* |
| | (.86) | (.79) | (.79) | (.83) | **(.23)** | (.23) | (.22) |
| Junior Coalition Partner | 1.20 | 1.45* | 1.44* | 1.46* | **1.23*** | 1.28* | 1.29* |
| | (.14) | (.14) | (.14) | (.15) | **(.10)** | (.11) | (.11) |
| Electoral Reform | | | .87 | .87 | **.89** | .89 | .90 |
| | | | (.08) | (.07) | **(.06)** | (.07) | (.08) |
| Electoral Permissiveness | | | | 1.12 | **1.10** | 1.10 | 1.05 |
| | | | | (.19) | **(.10)** | (.10) | (.11) |
| Lagged Seat Share | | | | | **1.06*** | 1.06* | 1.06* |
| | | | | | **(.01)** | (.00) | (.00) |
| SE Cluster / Shared Frailty | Party | Party | Party | Party | **Party** | Country | Election |
| Country Fixed-Effects | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | **Yes** | Yes | Yes |
| N (Time at Risk) | 3,662 | 3,662 | 3,631 | 3,631 | **3,631** | 3,361 | 3,631 |
| Sigma | 1.19 | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.05 | **.82** | .82 | .81 |
| Log-Likelihood | -1,031 | -955 | -955 | -942 | **-841** | -842 | -838 |
| AIC | 2,075 | 1,995 | 1,995 | 1,971 | **1,772** | 1,774 | 1,766 |

Table A4 estimates the same models in Table A3, using a Cox proportional hazard models, instead of the log-normal regression. The results in Table A4 are, again, supportive of the claims made above. Note that the results of a Cox model should be a mirror image of the results of a log-normal model. This is due to the difference of information estimated by each model. The log-normal model estimates Accelerated Failure Time (AFT, i.e. the number of elections a party survives), while Cox PH model estimates the hazard of failure associated with the covariates. Thus, we should expect the Cox model to produce coefficients smaller than 1 when the log-normal model produces coefficients larger than 1, and vice versa. This is exactly the results shown in Table A4. Through all model specifications the coefficients on moderate Left-Right positions, ideological space, and government participation are significant, and similar in size, while the institutional controls are insignificant. In addition, the coefficient on the space variable is larger than the coefficient on the moderate variable, and the same is true for the Prime-Minister and junior coalition member coefficients. These results support the arguments that a party should prefer a distinctive position over a moderate one, and that the hazard associated with being the Prime-Minister's party is smaller than being a junior coalition member. Table A4 also demonstrates that relative to the other Cox models, the model specification presented in the main text (Model V) maximizes goodness-of-fit to the data.

**Part 3: Niche and Mainstream Parties; Similarities and Differences**

The research I presented in the main text does not distinguish between mainstream and niche parties. Distinguishing between mainstream and niche parties is out of the scope of this paper, and calls for further research on the specific dynamics of party survival for either kind of parties. When discussing niche parties in the context of party survival one should note three issues. First, the definition of which parties are niche and which parties are not might change the results and affect the theory (see Meyer and Miller (2015) for further discussion). In the analysis shown below, I follow Meguid (2005) and Spoon's (2011) definition of niche parties. Second, on average, niche parties (especially if one uses Meguid's definition of niche) have emerged significantly later than mainstream parties. Therefore, by definition, niche parties survive shorter time than mainstream parties. Moreover, it might be the case that not enough time has passed to allow them to fail. Thus, there is a higher percentage of right censored niche parties. Third, niche parties emerge less frequently than other parties. Taking all there points together, the 203 niche parties (25% of the parties) contribute only 519 observations to the data set (15% of all observations).

Table 4: Robustness Checks – Cox Proportional Hazard Models

| | I | II | III | IV | V | VI | VII |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moderate | .92* (.03) | .90* (.03) | .90* (.03) | .90* (.03) | .93* (.03) | | |
| Space | .77* (.04) | .74* (.04) | .74* (.06) | .74* (.04) | .79* (.04) | | |
| Prime-Minister | .29* (.07) | .25* (.06) | .25* (.06) | .24* (.06) | .39* (.10) | | |
| Junior Coalition Partner | .88 (.10) | .78* (.08) | .79* (.08) | .78* (.08) | .80* (.09) | | |
| Electoral Reform | | | 1.13 (.10) | 1.12 (.10) | 1.13 (.11) | | |
| Electoral Permissiveness | | | | .90 (.12) | .89 (.11) | | |
| Lagged Seat Share | | | | | .95* (.01) | | |
| SE Cluster / Shared Frailty | Party | Party | Party | Party | Party | | |
| Country Fixed-Effects | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | | |
| N (Time at Risk) | 3,662 | 3,662 | 3,662 | 3,631 | 3,631 | | |
| Log-Likelihood | -3,240 | -3,193 | -3,192 | -3,133 | -3,107 | | |
| AIC | 6,489 | 6,466 | 6,466 | 6,348 | 6,298 | | |

Models VIII and IX are not concave or cannot be estimated using Cox proportional hazard

The discussion about the differences between niche and mainstream parties should promote a separate piece of research. However, Table A5 presents a good starting point for future discussion. Table A5 deals with niche parties using three different methods; the model in the first column excludes niche parties from the model presented in the main text. The model in the second column adds a dummy variable to the model presented in the main text. The model in the

third column is a fully interacted model (i.e. an interaction between the dummy variable of niche parties and each of the other variables). The fourth column presents the model from the main text for reference. The models presented in Table A5 are very stable. They all provide similar results with respect to the variable of interest presented in the main text. These results imply that noting niche parties as a different group from all other parties does not changes the conclusions about party durability. Moreover, all the interaction terms in the third column are statistically insignificant. This is an interesting result because it implies that being a niche party does not mean an additional effect on any of the variables discussed in the main text.

Table A5: Mainstream and Niche Parties

| | Excluding Niche Parties | Niche Parties as a Dummy Variable | Fully Interacted Model | Model from the Main Text |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moderate | 1.06 | 1.06* | 1.05 | 1.05 |
| | (.04) | (.03) | (.03) | (.03) |
| Space | 1.21* | 1.19* | 1.22* | 1.17* |
| | (.05) | (.05) | (.05) | (.05) |
| Prime-Minister | 1.60* | 1.61* | 1.62* | 1.62* |
| | (.22) | (.24) | (.23) | (.23) |
| Junior Coalition Partner | 1.26* | 1.29* | 1.28* | 1.23* |
| | (.10) | (.10) | (.10) | (.10) |
| Electoral Reform | .85* | .89 | .89 | .89 |
| | (.06) | (.07) | (.06) | (.06) |
| Electoral Permissiveness | 1.10 | 1.10 | 1.12 | 1.10 |
| | (.10) | (.10) | (.10) | (.10) |
| Lagged Seat Share | 1.06* | 1.06* | 1.06* | 1.06* |
| | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) | (.01) |
| Niche Party | | 1.14 | 1.50 | |
| | | (.11) | (.68) | |
| Moderate * Niche | | | 1.06 | |
| | | | (.08) | |
| Space * Niche | | | .83 | |
| | | | (.08) | |
| Prime-Minister * Niche | | | Empty | |
| Junior Coalition Partner * Niche | | | 1.10 | |
| | | | (.33) | |
| Electoral Reform * Niche | | | 1.05 | |
| | | | (.15) | |
| Electoral Permissiveness * Niche | | | .93 | |
| | | | (.10) | |
| Lagged Seat Share * Niche | | | 1.03 | |
| | | | (.03) | |
| SE Cluster / Shared Frailty | Party | Party | Party | Party |
| Country Fixed-Effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N (Time at Risk) | 2,952 | 3,471 | 3,471 | 3,631 |
| Sigma | .79 | .81 | .80 | .82 |
| Log-Likelihood | -635.1 | -812.1 | -809.2 | -841 |
| AIC | 1,358 | 1,714 | 1,720 | 1,772 |

**Part 4: Checking Robustness for different outcomes**

Table 6A-10A check the robustness of the results using additional model specifications. In these tables, Model 1 adds a control variable for level of federalism. This variable is coded as in Lijphart (2012). In model 2, the variable of federalism is taken from the Quality of Government Project (QoG[1]). While the Lijphart data is extensively used, it has the limitation of covering a relatively small set of countries. Using either of these two measures in the models presented in the original or the revised submission does not improve the model fit, or statistically affect duration of survival, nor it changes the substantive argument made in the paper. In model 1 (Lijphart) and model 2 (QoG), level of federalism is not statistically significant, and moreover, including these variables in the model does not change the paper's substantive conclusions. However, these variables cause significant data lost, as there are a lot of missing data on both.

Model 3 replaces the measure of permissiveness with a breakdown of the electoral system to its components. The variable *number of districts* is a count variable indicating how many electoral districts are in the country (e.g. Israel=1, UK=650). The variable *Multi-tier* is a dummy variable, coded as 0 is the country has only 1 electoral tier and 1 if the country has more than 1 electoral tier. The variable *Number of seats* is a country variable for the total number of seats in parliament (Israel=120, UK=650). As one can see, these do not change the main arguments made in this paper. They are all statistically insignificant.

Model 4 provides a measure for the economic context of the election. Here, the economic context is measured as the *real GDP growth*, using the QoG data. This variable is insignificant and including it in the analysis does not mediate the results. It is, however, decreases the amount of available data.

It should be noted that when the dependent variable is failure due to merges, dissolution, or splits, some of the results in these models are statistically insignificant. This is a plausible result given the small number of failures. Although this is not ideal, the direction of the coefficients is still as expected, and all the results hold when the dependent variable is failure due to electoral defeat.

Figure A4 below shows three additional robustness checks. The first model in Figure 6 (denoted by the black nodes and confidence bars) excludes the 11 post-communist countries from the analysis. The results of this model are consistent with the main model presented in Figure 4 in the text. Ideological distinctiveness increases duration of survival ($\beta$=1.27, $p$=0.00). Left-Right moderation also have a positive association with survival in parliament, but the magnitude of this

[1] https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata

association is smaller ($\beta$=1.07 $p$=0.09). Being a prime ministerial party ($\beta$=1.66, $p$=0.04) and junior coalition partner ($\beta$=137, $p$=0.00) increases parties' survival time, and so does party size. The control variables electoral reform and electoral permissiveness are insignificant.

The second model in Figure A4 (denoted by the light gray nodes and confidence bars) excludes all parties that disappear from parliament due to merging into a different party or splitting to more than one party. Here again, most of the results are the same as in Figure 4 (in the text) and in the first model of Figure A4 (here). One difference worth noting is the negative and significant coefficient of the electoral reform variable ($\beta$=0.77, $p$=0.01). This result implies that when excluding parties that merged or split, changes in the electoral rules are associated with shorter duration of survival. This finding could have important implications for the strategic behavior of parties' elite and could be a subject for future research.

Lastly, the third robustness check (denoted in dark gray) directly controls for new democracies and ethnic heterogeneity.[2] Using these two variables as controls (instead of country fixed-effects) does not mediate the results in this paper. The association between competing in a new democracy and shorter duration of survival is an obvious outcome of the shorter democratic experience in these countries. In a country were the maximum number of election is small, the number of elections a party can survive must be small too. The positive and significant result with respect to ethnic heterogeneity is a subject for future research.

Figure A4: Additional Robustness Checks




Note: Nodes represent coefficients of log-normal duration models where positive coefficients imply longer survival time. Bars show 95% confidence intervals. Country fixed-effects are not shown. N (Time at Risk) = 3,052 (upper model); 2,935 (middle model); 3,631 (lower model).

[2] New democracy is coded as 1 for countries that had their first democratic election after 1989 and 0 otherwise. Ethnic heterogeneity is coded as the effective number of ethnic groups and the data for this variable is collected by Fearon (2003), updated by the author.

Table 6A: Additional model specifications – Pooled model

| | Model I | Model II | Model III | Model IV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ideological Space | 1.311** | 1.181** | 1.194** | 1.242** |
| | (0.081) | (0.047) | (0.050) | (0.070) |
| Ideological Moderation | 1.076 | 1.053 | 1.055 | 1.030 |
| | (0.042) | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.035) |
| Prime Minister | 1.605 | 1.497** | 1.631** | 1.729** |
| | (0.400) | (0.210) | (0.240) | (0.316) |
| Junior Partner | 1.372** | 1.237** | 1.183* | 1.199* |
| | (0.154) | (0.095) | (0.095) | (0.110) |
| Lagged seat share | 1.366** | 1.307** | 1.309** | 1.380** |
| | (0.054) | (0.035) | (0.036) | (0.053) |
| Electoral reform | 0.924 | 0.925 | 0.933 | 0.942 |
| | (0.084) | (0.063) | (0.068) | (0.080) |
| Permissiveness | 1.114 | 1.119 | | 1.037 |
| | (0.123) | (0.104) | | (0.100) |
| Threshold | | | 0.975* | 0.913 |
| | | | (0.011) | (0.056) |
| Age of Democracy | 1.005** | 1.005** | 1.007** | 1.006 |
| | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.004) |
| Number of districts | | | 1.000 | |
| | | | (0.004) | |
| Multi-tier | | | 1.116 | |
| | | | (0.126) | |
| Number of seats | | | 0.999 | |
| | | | (0.002) | |
| Federalism (QoG) | | 1.151 | 1.134 | |
| | | (0.109) | (0.109) | |
| Federalism (Lijphart) | 0.678 | | | |
| | (0.159) | | | |
| Real GDP Growth | | | | 1.005 |
| | | | | (0.013) |
| ln-Sigma | 0.900** | 0.806** | 0.800** | 0.814** |
| | (0.036) | (0.028) | (0.029) | (0.035) |
| Constant | 1.402 | 0.481 | 1.130 | 1.005 |
| | (0.848) | (0.227) | (0.707) | (0.593) |
| Observations | 3,004 | 3,316 | 2,901 | 2,361 |
| Number of subjects | 512 | 720 | 654 | 527 |
| Number of failures | 346 | 491 | 453 | 344 |
| Sigma | 0.900 | 0.806 | 0.800 | 0.814 |
| Log_Likelihood | -586.8 | -782.5 | -704.3 | -512.6 |

Table 7A: Additional model specifications – Dissolved Parties

| | Model I | Model II | Model III | Model IV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ideological Space | 1.302* | 1.251* | 1.374** | 1.306* |
| | (0.139) | (0.110) | (0.133) | (0.147) |
| Ideological Moderation | 1.106 | 1.125 | 1.183* | 1.099 |
| | (0.087) | (0.076) | (0.086) | (0.091) |
| Prime Minister | 1.528 | 1.350 | 1.392 | 1.156 |
| | (0.514) | (0.433) | (0.452) | (0.453) |
| Junior Partner | 1.529 | 1.642* | 1.544* | 1.878* |
| | (0.425) | (0.340) | (0.332) | (0.483) |
| Lagged seat share | 1.839** | 1.410** | 1.378** | 1.567** |
| | (0.279) | (0.102) | (0.093) | (0.167) |
| Electoral reform | 0.872 | 0.911 | 0.911 | 0.642* |
| | (0.179) | (0.166) | (0.171) | (0.143) |
| Permissiveness | 1.377 | 1.284 | | 1.502 |
| | (0.349) | (0.300) | | (0.413) |
| Threshold | | | 0.998 | 1.526* |
| | | | (0.020) | (0.273) |
| Age of Democracy | 1.015** | 1.020** | 1.020** | 1.011 |
| | (0.005) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.008) |
| Number of districts | | | 1.017 | |
| | | | (0.011) | |
| Multi-tier | | | 1.026 | |
| | | | (0.362) | |
| Number of seats | | | 0.999 | |
| | | | (0.005) | |
| Federalism (QoG) | | 0.687 | 0.707 | |
| | | (0.141) | (0.149) | |
| Federalism (Lijphart) | 0.445* | | | |
| | (0.176) | | | |
| Real GDP Growth | | | | 1.025 |
| | | | | (0.036) |
| ln-Sigma | 0.959 | 1.005 | 1.007 | 0.974 |
| | (0.081) | (0.070) | (0.071) | (0.082) |
| Constant | 1.067 | 0.413 | 0.132 | 0.008** |
| | (1.199) | (0.472) | (0.196) | (0.013) |
| Observations | 2,087 | 2,200 | 1,912 | 1,621 |
| Number of subjects | 237 | 320 | 287 | 247 |
| Number of failures | 71 | 91 | 86 | 66 |
| Sigma | 0.959 | 1.005 | 1.007 | 0.974 |
| Log_Likelihood | -154.8 | -211 | -195 | -137.3 |

Table 8A: Additional model specifications – Merges

| | Model I | Model II | Model III | Model IV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ideological Space | 1.292** | 1.181** | 1.166* | 1.195* |
| | (0.110) | (0.069) | (0.070) | (0.085) |
| Ideological Moderation | 1.020 | 1.029 | 1.028 | 0.985 |
| | (0.061) | (0.046) | (0.049) | (0.053) |
| Prime Minister | 2.212* | 1.651* | 1.641* | 1.607 |
| | (0.818) | (0.334) | (0.325) | (0.439) |
| Junior Partner | 1.221 | 1.159 | 1.151 | 1.135 |
| | (0.178) | (0.123) | (0.131) | (0.157) |
| Lagged seat share | 1.406** | 1.333** | 1.348** | 1.461** |
| | (0.066) | (0.044) | (0.048) | (0.065) |
| Electoral reform | 1.169 | 1.006 | 1.035 | 1.002 |
| | (0.164) | (0.101) | (0.110) | (0.129) |
| Permissiveness | 1.112 | 1.099 | | 1.010 |
| | (0.167) | (0.139) | | (0.138) |
| Threshold | | | 0.959* | 0.796 |
| | | | (0.017) | (0.126) |
| Age of Democracy | 1.009** | 1.010** | 1.010** | 1.017** |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.006) |
| Number of districts | | | 1.001 | |
| | | | (0.005) | |
| Multi-tier | | | 1.066 | |
| | | | (0.185) | |
| Number of seats | | | 1.003 | |
| | | | (0.003) | |
| Federalism (QoG) | | 1.040 | 1.037 | |
| | | (0.109) | (0.109) | |
| Federalism (Lijphart) | 0.411** | | | |
| | (0.127) | | | |
| Real GDP Growth | | | | 1.039 |
| | | | | (0.022) |
| ln-Sigma | 0.919 | 0.838** | 0.831** | 0.849** |
| | (0.046) | (0.041) | (0.042) | (0.046) |
| Constant | 3.488 | 0.668 | 0.707 | 2.215 |
| | (2.911) | (0.434) | (0.571) | (2.477) |
| Observations | 2,461 | 2,629 | 2,293 | 1,879 |
| Number of subjects | 329 | 461 | 416 | 338 |
| Number of failures | 163 | 232 | 215 | 156 |
| Sigma | 0.919 | 0.838 | 0.831 | 0.849 |
| Log_Likelihood | -298.9 | -413.9 | -373 | -261.9 |

Table 9A: Additional model specifications – Electoral Defeats

| | Model I | Model II | Model III | Model IV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ideological Space | 1.240* | 1.195** | 1.217** | 1.275** |
| | (0.110) | (0.072) | (0.075) | (0.104) |
| Ideological Moderation | 1.172** | 1.117** | 1.115* | 1.097* |
| | (0.068) | (0.046) | (0.048) | (0.050) |
| Prime Minister | 1.814 | 1.681* | 1.955** | 1.705* |
| | (0.714) | (0.361) | (0.435) | (0.454) |
| Junior Partner | 1.540* | 1.375** | 1.283* | 1.293 |
| | (0.298) | (0.168) | (0.161) | (0.182) |
| Lagged seat share | 1.547** | 1.350** | 1.357** | 1.518** |
| | (0.154) | (0.060) | (0.058) | (0.085) |
| Electoral reform | 0.948 | 0.925 | 0.941 | 1.017 |
| | (0.136) | (0.100) | (0.108) | (0.134) |
| Permissiveness | 0.858 | 0.987 | | 1.013 |
| | (0.173) | (0.161) | | (0.153) |
| Threshold | | | 0.975 | 0.920 |
| | | | (0.014) | (0.071) |
| Age of Democracy | 1.010** | 1.010** | 1.012** | 1.009 |
| | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.005) |
| Number of districts | | | 1.004 | |
| | | | (0.006) | |
| Multi-tier | | | 1.271 | |
| | | | (0.221) | |
| Number of seats | | | 0.997 | |
| | | | (0.002) | |
| Federalism (QoG) | | 1.075 | 1.053 | |
| | | (0.143) | (0.143) | |
| Federalism (Lijphart) | 0.434** | | | |
| | (0.115) | | | |
| Real GDP Growth | | | | 0.987 |
| | | | | (0.018) |
| ln-Sigma | 0.998 | 0.909 | 0.885* | 0.846** |
| | (0.069) | (0.045) | (0.045) | (0.049) |
| Constant | 7.866* | 0.795 | 0.825 | 0.813 |
| | (6.656) | (0.638) | (0.733) | (0.712) |
| Observations | 2,307 | 2,556 | 2,225 | 1,866 |
| Number of subjects | 324 | 472 | 424 | 349 |
| Number of failures | 158 | 243 | 223 | 167 |
| Sigma | 0.998 | 0.909 | 0.885 | 0.846 |
| Log_Likelihood | -323.7 | -473.4 | -418.5 | -293.5 |

Table 10A: Additional model specifications – Splits

| | Model I | Model II | Model III | Model IV |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ideological Space | 1.847** | 1.537** | 1.640** | 1.631** |
| | (0.282) | (0.158) | (0.178) | (0.234) |
| Ideological Moderation | 1.156 | 1.100 | 1.177* | 1.123 |
| | (0.101) | (0.074) | (0.087) | (0.095) |
| Prime Minister | 2.878 | 1.722 | 2.134* | 3.642* |
| | (1.564) | (0.564) | (0.774) | (2.200) |
| Junior Partner | 1.572 | 1.324 | 1.234 | 1.400 |
| | (0.405) | (0.247) | (0.248) | (0.317) |
| Lagged seat share | 1.285** | 1.259** | 1.230** | 1.307** |
| | (0.089) | (0.062) | (0.059) | (0.102) |
| Electoral reform | 0.922 | 0.909 | 0.932 | 0.741 |
| | (0.191) | (0.150) | (0.162) | (0.164) |
| Permissiveness | 1.702* | 1.573* | | 1.596 |
| | (0.425) | (0.334) | | (0.384) |
| Threshold | | | 0.973 | 0.978 |
| | | | (0.024) | (0.197) |
| Age of Democracy | 1.024** | 1.026** | 1.024** | 1.027** |
| | (0.004) | (0.004) | (0.005) | (0.009) |
| Number of districts | | | 1.021* | |
| | | | (0.010) | |
| Multi-tier | | | 1.128 | |
| | | | (0.289) | |
| Number of seats | | | 1.005 | |
| | | | (0.005) | |
| Federalism (QoG) | | 0.921 | 0.995 | |
| | | (0.165) | (0.180) | |
| Federalism (Lijphart) | 0.447* | | | |
| | (0.162) | | | |
| Real GDP Growth | | | | 1.036 |
| | | | | (0.032) |
| ln-Sigma | 1.068 | 0.991 | 0.999 | 1.022 |
| | (0.082) | (0.069) | (0.071) | (0.087) |
| Constant | 0.286 | 0.097* | 0.020* | 0.040* |
| | (0.327) | (0.103) | (0.034) | (0.064) |
| Observations | 2,101 | 2,222 | 1,934 | 1,621 |
| Number of subjects | 242 | 330 | 294 | 252 |
| Number of failures | 76 | 101 | 93 | 71 |
| Sigma | 1.068 | 0.991 | 0.999 | 1.022 |
| Log_Likelihood | -166 | -220.9 | -198.3 | -142.4 |

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